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Elaborating the notion of performativity 
BTP pour le viaduc de Millau et le contrat d’entreprise passé par un particulier avec 
une entreprise de nettoyage ? 
Anni Borzeix : Si la question avait été : qu’est-ce qu’un service pour vous ? 
Augustin Aynes : J’ai du mal à vous répondre, parce que cette notion n’existe pas en 
droit. Quand on dit que le droit de la concurrence s’applique à la production, à la 
distribution et aux services, on n’a pas de définition claire des trois éléments. On veut 
juste dire que le texte s’applique à toute l’activité économique  
Notes prises par Hervé Dumez 
PREG — CNRS / École Polytechnique 
(Suite de la page 17) 
Q uestion : In your paper called ‘What does it mean to say that economics is performative’ you state that ‘both natural and life sciences, along with the 
social sciences contribute towards enacting the realities that they describe’. And 
then here in ESOCITE1 on your lecture you spoke about the carbon market as an 
example of economical, environmental, technical and social heterogeneous 
artifact experimentation. In saying so, what would be the role of the social 
sciences as makers of some kind of artifacts and the social world itself ? 
There are several ways of describing the main theoretical and epistemological 
achievements of science and technology studies (STS). We can say, for example, that 
STS have made it possible to conceive of a third way between realism and 
relativism : science and techniques “explicitate” reality by constructing it and 
construct reality by “explicitating” it. This process of explanation maintains both 
the existence of a reality that resists, that doesn’t do just anything, and the idea that 
this reality, engaged in various trials, can resist in various different ways ; in short, it 
is multiple, ambiguous and, why not, constructed or instituted, instated. To use 
Austin’s vocabulary, one could also say that scientific statements – to take only 
them – are performative. Above all, this assertion would shield us from the 
temptation to contend that they are constative, that they try to describe and 
analyse a reality on which they will not intervene. 
The notion of performativity, as presented by Austin, has been criticized, first of all 
by Austin himself ! Of course it can be taken to mean that language creates the world 
from scratch, somewhat like the ‘Fiat Lux’ of the Old Testament. But those who 
adopt the repertoire of performativity are careful not to stick to this meaning. The 
STS have completed and enriched the concept, by showing that the signification and 
effectiveness of scientific statements cannot be dissociated from the socio-technical 
arrangements or agencements involved in the production of the facts that those same 
statements refer to. This concerns the heterogeneous material and textual nature of 
scientific practices. Statements are entangled with technical devices, incorporated 
competencies, rules of thumb, rules and procedures. With the facts that they 
1. Michel Callon gave the 
inaugural speech (The 
contribution of SSSTS to the 
renewing of the conceptions 
of the social: the case of 
economic markets) at VII 
Esocite – Jornadas Latino-
Americanas de Estudos 
Sociais das Ciências e das 
Tecnologias, on 28th, 29th 
and 30th May 2008 in Rio de 
Janeiro (Brazil).  
Au printemps 2006, Michel 
Callon était intervenu au 
séminaire AEGIS sur la 
question de la 
performativité de 
l’économie. Le compte 
rendu du séminaire a paru 
dans le Libellio n°3 de juin 
2006. Dans cette interview 
accordée à des chercheurs 
brésiliens, Michel Callon 
revient sur la question en 
précisant certains points et 
en resituant cette 
approche dans la ligne de 
ses travaux antérieurs. 
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describe, they are embedded in the agencements in which they are stakeholders. There 
aren’t materialities on the one hand and text on the other. Statements contribute to 
giving meaning to the events that the agencements produce, and these events support 
what the statements say. To put it more philosophically, and following Bruno 
Latour (1999), statements are indissoluble from all the devices that cause the entities 
they talk about to exist, actually to act. As Latour has shown, this point of view is 
both realistic and constructivist : realistic because it isn’t possible to make just 
anything exist (in the expression ‘Fiat Lux’, for the light to exist, it had to be able to 
exist !)  ; and constructivist because for any one entity there are thousands of ways of 
existing, of being detached from the surrounding plasma : existing is acting. What 
science and techniques manage to do – and this is the project that gives them their 
strength and power of truth and effectiveness – is to make entities act in a controlled 
and predictable way. Presented like this, these entities can be analysed and become 
the object of knowledge. With the ‘representing and intervening’ twosome, Hacking 
(1983) captured this dual dimension of scientific practices perfectly. 
Strangely enough, STS have shown an interest in the social sciences only episodically 
and marginally. This may seem surprising at first, since the social sciences appear to 
be easier to deconstruct than the natural sciences. But I think that there’s another 
reason for this reluctance : it stems from the social sciences’ uncertainty about their 
own scientificity. Take the case of economics. If you questioned sociologists, 
anthropologists and science studies scholars, you’d find that they have an 
irrepressible tendency to consider that neo-classical theory – to mention only one – 
especially when it is highly mathematized, is simply eyewash, closer to ideology than 
to science. For them, studying economics and its effects amounts to nothing more or 
less than studying a particular belief ! They think that if economists and economics 
have an influence, it is because they are able to make people believe that what they 
say is true. People therefore behave as if it were true ; they’re alienated, and it’s 
because of that alienation that what economics says is true. Economics is a vast self-
fulfilling prophecy, from every point of view comparable to religion. It is the new 
opiate of the masses ! 
I find this type of attitude incomprehensible. Why make an exception and consider 
that in this particular case truth is defined by the correspondence between a 
discourse and a reality outside of that discourse ? Economics, like the other sciences, 
serves to represent. But to account for what it calls the economy, it has to contribute 
in one way or another to the constitution of the object that it is accounting for – like 
any other scientific discipline. In other words, it has to find in the world it is 
studying – and which, as I have shown, can be reduced to a simple world of paper ! – 
the elements that will enable it to define it, to act on it, and to account for it. I 
thought that to describe this approach, the notion of performativity could be useful. 
To avoid any misinterpretation, a mistake so easy to make (some people have 
thought that I was saying that the economy was created entirely by economics !), I 
finally opted for the notion of performation. This term underscores the fact that 
there are no effects of knowledge without well-designed interventions, and that it is 
these interventions, with the events that they produce and that they enable us to 
describe, which are at the origin of the production of facts. I moreover recently 
added that this activity of performation is always caught up in collective activities 
which don’t mobilize only professional economists. That’s why I spoke of co-
performation. 
Contrary to what some suggest, this dual terminological shift (from performativity 
to performation and then to co-performation) does not weaken and dilute the 
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analysis. I haven’t digressed since The Laws of the Markets, in which I emphasized 
the material devices and role of economic agents. The essence of the message 
presented in that introduction has been maintained and reinforced. It can be 
summed up in three points. First, the economy does not exist as an economy before 
the elaboration and implementation of the knowledge, statements and 
representations which cause it to exist as an object of both knowledge and 
intervention, in short, as an economy. Second, this knowledge and these statements 
and representations are largely the result of the relentless and competent work of 
professional economists, irrespective of their theoretical convictions. But they are 
not the only ones to be engaged in this elaboration ; one has to add all those who 
work in academic disciplines related to economics, like management science, and all 
those who are in the field – computer scientists, market professionals, social 
movements etc. – who develop increasingly formalized, systematic and abstract 
knowledge and competencies, as well as technical devices, and who give the economy 
its identity and robustness. I have proposed the notion of economics at large to 
denote this vast and heterogeneous population engaged in reflection, conceptual 
elaboration, and socio-technical design of the economy in all its forms. Third, the 
economy thus constituted is composed of technical elements, incorporated 
competencies, rules and … sets of theories, models and statements : in other words, 
what we call the economy consists of agencements that qualify themselves as 
economic. 
The economy, as a name denoting an object, points towards agencements which can 
be qualified as economic because economics is a stakeholder in them, in one form or 
another. The notion of co-performation stresses, even more than that of 
performativity, the fact that there is no economy without economics ! This applies as 
much to modern economies as to past or exotic economies.  
The objection has often been made that markets existed well before economics 
started to talk about them, and that they will carry on existing even if economics no 
longer talks about them. I understand this argument but it’s beside the point that I 
am making. This point is both difficult and obvious. Perhaps the notion of plasma 
used by Bruno Latour could help to make it clearer. Bruno tells us that the world 
obviously existed before anyone spoke about it, analysed it or experienced it through 
practices that introduced a certain order into it. This is as true of the so-called 
natural world as it is of the so-called social world. It’s true of our contemporary 
world, and of the past world that we try to rediscover by following the traces that it 
left behind, for example in archives, memoirs or myths. This world, that can be 
compared to plasma, lives its life ; the numerous forces comprising and organizing it 
make it evolve. One day comes economics. Concretely : one day come Aristotle and 
Xenophon. Exploiting accumulated experience, existing discourses, and notions 
patiently built up, they reveal in this plasma, in this very real but not yet 
economized world, the main themes, discontinuities, gradients of resistance, divides 
and interstices that they play with and compose. They think they see the forms of 
what they call oikonomia. They build statements, give examples, draw conclusions 
and make recommendations. The quality of this work of explicitation is measured by 
its capacity to convince, that is, to define the right themes and to play with them in 
the right way. That’s the stroke of genius. The explicitation has been successful. The 
economy starts to exist as a distinct object, because Aristotle and Xenophon knew 
how to divide up, reassemble and cluster the plasma surrounding them. Of course 
there were forces, entities, organized matter from which the work of economics, 
carried out intelligently and pragmatically, was able to produce entities. But the 
economy is born as an economy, by the grace of these well-adjusted discourses. 
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Afterwards, it’s another story, that of performation : the object and its discourse are 
bound together for better or for worse. Their histories become indissoluble. 
I think that we’ve passed a stage in this evolution. Economics has spread, 
diversified ; it is taken in charge by a multitude of groups that intervene in 
contradictory and divergent ways, but that all want to ensure the existence, in a 
lucid, organized and reflexive way, of the economies that they see as desirable and 
possible. I can therefore say, without being eccentric, that the market did not exist, 
but that there were things, entities, and systems of forces which lent themselves to 
this gentle violence of Aristotle and Xenophon and then of all those who have called 
themselves economists and have advised princes and presidents ; and that, thus 
explicated, these sets of entities started to think (or to be thought), and to act and 
exist differently. They became what they were not yet, strictly speaking : markets. 
This history was so successful that now everything is market, whereas previously 
nothing was ! Markets have been conquered, like the polders from the sea, both by 
searching history and the earliest societies, and by colonizing modern societies. 
Markets are not comparable to gold nuggets, already there, that the economist-gold 
washer, with talent and persistence, separates from the gangue in which they are 
hidden.  
This leads me to challenge the notions that are usually used to describe the relations 
between economics and the economy : those of prescription, of self-fulfilling 
prophecy, and of applications. I’ve explained all that in Callon (2007). 
The reality and pervasiveness of this collective activity of co-performation now seem 
to be acknowledged, even if they are not formulated in the terms that I use. This 
growing awareness is evident in the case of financial markets that resemble huge 
socio-technical artefacts, and whose regulation, as we are currently seeing, poses 
enormous problems to their designers, including a wide diversity of professional 
groups. It is also apparent in studies called market design. If some of the best 
economists felt the need to invent this notion, it was because they fully understood 
that the notion of application was misleading, as it is for describing and 
understanding classical technological innovations. Could one say that a car, a 
computer, a spaceship or an I-phone are simply applications of disciplines and of 
constituted scientific knowledge ? You have to be naïve, like Colander (2008) for 
example, to dare to say something of the sort ! Once you’ve recognized this design 
activity, the question is to know how it is organized, who participates in the design 
of markets, how experiments are conducted, and how the results are evaluated. My 
aim is to ensure that this design is as open and democratic as possible. 
Question : Is it possible to understand national scientific communities as 
networks of socio-technical experimentation ? If it is so, what are the differences 
between these networks in developed and underdeveloped countries? Which are the 
consequences of these differences to the socio-technical experimentations ? 
There is no general answer to this question, but we can clarify things by introducing 
the notion of objectification of economic activity, proposed by Tim Mitchell. 
The question of autonomization of economic activities, that is, the existence of a 
sphere of institutions or social sub-systems that one can qualify as economic, was 
hotly debated for a long time and still is ! From this point of view, the controversy 
between formalists and substantivists in the 1960s, which has never been closed 
satisfactorily, is illuminating. 
Some people believed that formalists and substantivists differed on almost 
everything, especially on the implicit or explicit definition of the economy, on what 
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behaviours qualified as economic are, or on relations between individual action and 
social structures. Actually, apart from these disagreements, I think that they agreed 
on the essential : a) first, on the fact that it is possible to talk in general of the 
economy or of economic behaviours, irrespective of the society under consideration, 
as these notions have a near-universal signification ; b) second, on the fact that the 
economy as an autonomous sphere did not start to exist only with modern Western 
societies. Since this famous controversy, the terms of the debate have of course 
changed : sociologists of embeddedness, the heirs of the substantivists but who 
departed from them on this point, deny the existence of an autonomous economic 
sphere and of purely economic behaviours, even and especially in contemporary 
societies. Economists, on the other hand, have highlighted the importance of 
institutions, but mostly continue to support the idea that this does not preclude the 
existence of activities which are typically and specifically economic. Finally, some 
sociologists like Bourdieu or Fligstein, through the notion of field, posit the 
autonomy of the economy but equate it, from an analytical point of view, to any 
other social activity. Compared to the content of debates between formalists and 
substantivists, these variations are superficial. I have shown, with Koray Caliskan 
(forthcoming), that both believe in something that can be called the economy, which 
exists everywhere but in singular and variable concrete forms. So disagreements are 
not about the existence of the economy but on how it is defined. To simplify, there 
are those who set the economy in a form of individual (instrumental) rationality, and 
those who make it a constituent property of all human societies since their members 
are all confronted with a demand for subsistence (the meaning and scope of this 
notion, and the modalities of organization of the corresponding activities, obviously 
depend on the society in question). 
With the debate formulated in these terms, it is highly unlikely that we reach an 
agreement since every discipline believes in the economy but defines it in its own 
way, which is normal. To get away from this controversy, which was productive but 
is now sterile, I think we need to move on from the study of the economy to that of 
processes of economization. The question is not : what do we call economic 
behaviour, or what is the economy, but how are behaviours, institutions, agencements 
and rules of the game economized ? This new formulation leads to that of 
objectification of the economy in the form of an independent reality that becomes 
‘The Economy’. So, the question : what are the conditions of the constitution of 
‘economic’ entities that are endowed with some degree of autonomy, are organized 
objectively, have interdependent elements, and on which it is possible to act ? In 
short : how does ‘The Economy’ appear ? 
The notion of objectification leads to that of the role of national frameworks. Tim 
Mitchell has suggested, in my opinion very convincingly, that the first form of 
objectification of the economy, which causes one to talk of ‘The Economy’ as an 
entity that holds together, on which one can act as on a well-defined object with its 
internal regulations, is the national economy. If we follow Mitchell, the first 
historical form of objectification of the economic sphere is that of national 
economies. This objectification has been prepared for a long time. The physiocrats, 
for example, contributed to it. But national economies as an objectified form of ‘The 
Economy’ reach maturity with the establishment of welfare states and the 
institution of macro-economic policies based on the idea of national economic 
systems, endowed with their own rules of functioning, regulation and equilibrium. 
The different versions of Keynesianism constitute the theoretical counterpart of this 
objectification. This first form of objectification, whose pre-eminence culminated in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s, was followed by a second form that I believe will in 
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turn prevail. National economies take second place and disappear behind markets 
which, designed to be transnational, are henceforth considered as the natural form of 
‘The Economy’, the one which enables individuals to behave rationally and in so 
doing to participate willy-nilly in collective progress. The market is a reality that 
suffices unto itself, and that circumscribes a territory in which the economy is 
expressed and exists. Here micro-economics takes pride of place ; it explains how 
markets ought to be designed to be efficient. With this second objectification, the 
first doesn’t disappear, far from it, but it shifts into the background. National 
frameworks seem to be less relevant and sometimes even hindrances to the second 
objectification. 
The second objectification has its fair share of conflicts, but they are different from 
those of the first. Contradictions between national economies are considered to be 
backward, and everywhere forces are mobilizing for or against the extension of 
markets. While decolonization and the assertion of the sovereignty of colonized 
countries was both a source and a consequence of the first objectification, the search 
for alternative forms of market organization, as advocated by micro-economics, is 
associated with the second one. Evidence that the latter does not oust the former, 
but instead is articulated to it, is provided by the movements struggling for 
alternative kinds of economies : they rely on national sovereignties and tend to 
consider national or regional contexts as natural frameworks for experiments which, 
if satisfactory, will be able to be transposed elsewhere. 
Collective experiments that strive to invent new forms of organization of the markets 
will not result in a uniform model, a one best way. The forms of definition and 
organization of the economy will vary, precisely in relation to national frameworks, 
the actors involved and, almost as importantly, objects and issues. Carbon markets 
will be very different from fishing quota markets because carbon molecules and fish 
don’t allow themselves to be economized in the same way ! 
Question : How does your work in ‘Some elements of a sociology of translations’ 
differ from ‘What does it mean to say that economics is performative ?’ Are there 
similarities between the concepts from your earlier works (translations, actor-
network) and the latter ones (as performativity and agency)? Does this 
conceptual change mean ruptures or methodological advance ? And how ? 
There is both continuity and change. One way of defining this dual movement is to 
revert to the distinction between humans and non-humans. 
I think that the sociology of translation, or what some (not us !) have called ANT, 
will remain in the history of the social sciences because it accomplished a decisive 
step. It (re)opened the question of social theory’s treatment of non-humans. Of 
course, non-humans were never forgotten ; one simply has to reread Marx, Durkheim 
or Weber to be convinced of that. But, for these three founding fathers – for the 
Marx of the crystallization of social relations in technology, the Durkheim of 
elementary forms of religious life who equates totems to mere surfaces on which 
society is projected, and the Weber of Economy and Society who tends to reduce 
techniques to their instrumental dimension – what the human sciences call non-
humans are handicapped beings. Their agency is inferior to that of humans or, to put 
it bluntly – and this is completely true when it concerns inanimate entities – they are 
denied all agency. They exist as resources, constraints or objective realities, but they 
don’t act. The sociology of translation, designed to understand the functioning, 
effectiveness and effects of science and techniques, has shown how mutilating this 
view is. Those that the social sciences call non-humans (a very negative term, as if 
one said of blacks that they were non-whites !) do well and truly act, and in 
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thousands of different ways. An electron acts differently to a gene, which acts 
differently to a cell phone, and so on. All are engaged in courses of action that 
produce differences, alter the state of the world, produce unexpected events, and 
trigger changes which would not have happened without them. So-called non-
humans participate actively in collective action : they influence it, redefine it from 
the inside, and generate changes of direction and trajectories. Nothing of what the 
world is or is becoming can be understood if these actants are disregarded. The term 
actants, borrowed from semiotics, has been very useful for describing the actions of 
non-humans, as it has the twofold advantage of saying that entities act and of not 
predicting the modalities of their action. It applies moreover to all acting entities, 
both human and non-human. I am convinced that this perspective has allowed for 
considerable progress and has profoundly contributed to reshaping social theory. 
An obvious limit of this first wave of studies stems from the fact that, by talking of 
the symmetrical treatment of humans and non-humans, sociologists have helped to 
strengthen the idea that they could be distinguished ! In short – and some of our 
British colleagues have gleefully pointed this out to us – one cannot simultaneously 
call for equality between humans and non-humans and deny the possibility of 
distinguishing between them. We were perfectly aware of this little bug, but it bore 
no weight compared to the number one emergency : making visible and once again 
problematical the status that the social sciences had granted to non-humans. There 
was no reason for us to feel responsible for a distinction that had been introduced 
explicitly and deliberately by social theory to preserve the irreducibly different 
character of human beings (intentionality, language, capacity to elaborate symbolic 
structures, etc.). Faced with this ostracism, the first step is the virtually inevitable 
one of positive discrimination, that is, affirmative action, by taking the distinctions 
that were made to stigmatize certain populations and showing their arbitrary, 
problematical and illegitimate nature. Affirmative action always starts by 
reaffirming a difference, thereby contributing to making it exist ! – but in the hope 
that it will one day be transcended. 
Once this principle of equality had been established, the next step was of course to 
get rid of the distinction itself. You start with racism first, to show its limits ; and 
then you get rid of the notion of race ! 
Several strategies were possible. The paths explored by Bruno Latour, John Law, 
Anne-Marie Mol and myself differed quite substantially, which is a good thing. 
Bruno (forthcoming) focused on existence through otherness and engaged in the 
exploration of what he called modes of existence or regimes of enunciation. John 
Law and Anne-Marie Mol undertook a programme of experimental ontology. 
Tracking the complexity of beings’ ontological statuses, they introduced crucial 
notions such as multiplicity, fluidity and ‘messes’, and in particular studied the 
methods of the social sciences and their engagement on the actors’ side. As for me, I 
turned to the classical question of agency, first to emphasize the nearly infinite 
nature of its forms and modalities, whether they are endowed with intentionality, 
are articulated or not in languages which are extraordinarily varied, are adaptive or 
interactive, or are limited to automatic behaviours. The extraordinarily poor 
vocabulary that repeats ad nauseam the incommensurability of forms of human and 
non-human action, by reducing each of them to a caricature, makes way to a much 
richer repertoire that highlights the multiplicity of configurations which thus 
become visible and can be counted, studied and analysed, from a point of view that 
is not only dynamic but also takes into account their interactions and cross-overs. 
Once this space has been given back to agencies, and without any preconception of 
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the way in which they are distributed, the question remains of their analysis. 
This is where the notion of socio-technical agencement that we have borrowed from 
Deleuze comes in. First, it enables us to build on a set of recent work which has 
contributed to renewing the study of action. Of course I have in mind the multi-
disciplinary research (with which computer science is associated) on distributed or 
situated action and cognition, the empirical analyses inspired by ANT and, more 
recently, disabilities studies. To cut a long story short, let’s say that with these 
studies a new view of action and cognition has gained recognition, in which a large 
number of different entities are mobilized. Each of them participates in the 
constitution and course of the action, in its own way. All action is collective, and its 
deployment is starting to be clearly understood. At last we know empirically what 
piloting, calculating, directing, choosing, making a statement, and so on means. 
Second, in relation to these studies, the notion of agencement contributes an 
additional idea, also found in Deleuze’s and in Foucault’s work. The place and the 
source of action are built into the agencement. There is no agency without agencement, 
and no agencement without agency. Studying the diversity of agencies means 
studying the diversity of agencements : intentionality, language, will, the capacity to 
programme, selfish calculation, and altruism are properties of agencements. We 
started for example by studying economic and market agencements, but also those 
that are generous or filled with compassion, and, more generally, (non) calculating 
agencements. In this respect the disabilities studies programme is especially useful, 
with its notions of prostheses, the right to compensation, and the constitution of 
personhood. 
One of the consequences of this approach is that we jettison the human/non-human 
distinction. Not only does it become useless, it also constitutes an obstacle. It is 
necessary to have exceptional circumstances and, to be honest, to have the 
somewhat complicated brain of certain social theoreticians or philosophers, to 
imagine that this classification could account for the infinite diversity of agencements 
and agencies ! This comment brings me to another point : agencements (may) include 
discourses, texts, theoretical statements, and models. This makes it possible to show 
how science in general, and social science in particular, participates in the 
performation of these agencies and the divides that they create. For example, the 
human sciences have contributed substantially to the distinction between human 
and non-human, and between human agency and non-human agency. It is this 
successful performation that now has to be deconstructed. The new social sciences 
have to undo what the old ones did, with as much zeal and effectiveness. 
Question : There is no rupture at all ? 
Between the sociology of translation of the 1980s and 1990s, and the theory of socio-
technical agencements of the 2000s, there is no discontinuity, only enrichment and 
deepening of the analysis. We can for example draw a direct link between translation 
and agencement : agencements are operators of translation, and translation is the basic 
module on which agencements are built. Acting means translating, and translating 
means influencing the capacities and modalities of action, since it means establishing 
links, connections, circulations, exchanges of properties, and original distributions. 
I gave an example of this complementarity in my talk for ESOCITE meeting. The 
economic model developed by Hardin is the basis for the organization of the fishing 
quota market. This model was presented in a scientific article in 1968. Thus, if we go 
by the precepts of ANT and the sociology of translation, it can be analysed as a 
socio-technical network (even if that means stopping at the relations woven by 
references). But as I showed in my lecture, this model is a stakeholder, in the sense of 
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action and distributed cognition, in the market socio-technical agencement that 
organizes fishing activities, especially in Norway. Without this model, this market 
agencement would not exist and would not act as it does. The same applies to every 
element of an agencement. Every one is an active part within the agencement and at 
the same time an operator of networking with other entities which are translated and 
participate in the agencement but indirectly. If you read Deleuze’s definition 
carefully, you’ll see that this ambivalence constitutes his definition of agencements. 
With the notion of agencement you have the notion of network or rhizome, but you 
lose nothing of the substance. The agents are no longer points or nodes, as in the 
network theory ; they have all the substance, the flesh, depth and unfathomable 
mystery of agencements. 
Question : Which are the effects of the dissolution/disintegration of a socio-
technical network ? How can we act in an uncertain network, in an uncertain 
world ? What happens with the performative action when there is some kind of 
interruption such as a natural disaster ? 
The notion of risk isn’t satisfactory. It was very useful to highlight the paradoxical 
effects of the technosciences and a change of regime in the modalities of policy-
making. It also contributed to salutary reflection on the nature of politics and, in a 
sense, helped to gain recognition for the usefulness of the precautionary principle. 
Unfortunately the notion of risk mixes many things that are worth distinguishing. It 
is at the origin of a lot of confusion and favours a certain intellectual laziness. 
To clarify the questions we need to revert to the famous distinction between risk and 
uncertainty proposed by Knight, but also to surpass it because it is far too imprecise. 
Knight distinguishes the notion of uncertainty from that of risk on only one point. 
In both cases, possible worlds are known and can be described convincingly, but in 
the former the probabilities of occurrence of each of these worlds is known (especially 
when they are envisaged as consequences of decisions to take), whether they are 
objective or subjective, whereas in the latter case the assignment of probabilities is 
impossible. Now, most of the uncertainties facing us today defy this binary 
classification. The technosciences produce as much ignorance and as many badly 
formulated questions waiting for answers that cannot be imagined a priori, as they 
produce robust knowledge on the states of the world. Rather than chanting that 
science produces as many bads as goods, it is fairer to say that it produces as many 
new questions without answers as positive knowledge. From this point of view, the 
opposition between goods and bads, that I can clearly see constitutes a powerful 
driver of mobilization, is anything but relevant and useful : everything that is 
unexpected – to use dedicated terminology – is not necessarily bad, and everything 
that is explicitly and voluntarily sought after is not necessarily good ! The 
technosciences are a formidable machine continuously producing matters of concern, 
that is, problems for which there are no theories or available answers but which can 
end up improving existing situations, if they are managed well. 
These uncertainties are therefore of a different kind to those studied by Knight and 
by all those who are fascinated by risk. They are linked to problem-framing that 
reveals vast zones of ignorance of differing degrees of intensity or completeness, but 
which are presented for what they are : areas of theoretical and practical non-
knowledge. In these situations, decision-making procedures are of a new kind. When 
science and technologies can’t serve as a benchmark, a baseline, when they are so 
embryonic that ignorance is the rule, you don’t know what situation you’re in nor 
what’s going to happen if you take such-and-such a decision. Yet this is no reason to 
give up all demands for rationality. On the contrary, the greater the ignorance, the 
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more urgent it is to act, and the more attentive one has to be to the reasons driving 
you to act. In situations of uncertainty, the need for rationality is twice as strong. 
In situations of radical uncertainty, rationality coincides with the wish for collective 
experimentation. Since one doesn’t know, one has to resolve oneself to organizing 
evidence that enables one to learn little by little. The main requirement is therefore 
to organize collective, controlled and debated experiments, to measure what can be 
done, and to take the necessary measures to do so. The precautionary principle sums 
up very well how decisions should be taken in situations of radical uncertainty, but it 
has to be connected to the notion of collective experimentation. In this form of 
experimentation, one takes small decisions and moves forwards by successive 
iteration. Gradually one can attain a situation that resembles those described by 
Knight, but nothing is written in advance, and in any case the usual notion of risk 
describes only certain situations or trends. All of this can be linked to what I said 
before on performation : it’s by performing that one learns and that one can re-
launch action and enrich practical and theoretical knowledge. 
Question : How the whole collection of works commonly known as ANT (actor-
network theory) handles with the political content of techno-science ? In which of 
these works the political concern is more evident ? Can the disabled people case 
studies be an example of this political concern ? 
The sociology of translation is known for having established an almost direct link 
between the technosciences and politics. There was nothing new about this 
approach. We’re used to hearing that everything is political and that science and 
techniques are no exception. One just has to think of the debates between 
externalists (who claimed that society could explain the content of science) and 
internalists (who argued the opposite) in the first half of the twentieth century. But I 
think I can say that the way in which the sociology of translation has described this 
link has completely renewed the subject. If science and techniques call for a political 
debate, it is because they cause a host of new beings to exist, that we have to accept 
(or reject) and with which we (may) have to learn to live. The issue here is the 
composition of the collective, and this question is now raised with urgency, for 
research and innovation have become highly productive. We are therefore forced 
into a political debate. 
This has led us to think a lot about the institutions, procedures and devices that 
make it possible both to maintain scientific and technical creativity (especially 
through the constitution and extension of socio-technical networks or innovation 
networks) and to discuss their organization, the limits to place on them, the 
configurations to exclude and those to favour. No innovation without 
representation ! That is the slogan of the sociology of translation when it gives itself 
a political conscience ! 
The paths that Bruno Latour and I have followed are different but complementary. 
Bruno has clarified the operations constituting a politics of networks, by showing 
how to reconsider relations between politics and nature. With my colleagues Yannick 
Barthe and Pierre Lascoumes (2009), I have explored the institutional configurations 
that make it possible to reconcile scientific adventure and political concerns. One of 
the main results that we have obtained pertains to the role of specialists and 
professionals. We have shown that the distinction between experts and lay people is 
meaningful and interesting only in situations where the question of the formulation 
of problems or matters of concern is basically sorted out. In these cognitively cold 
situations (but which can be politically very hot !) the knowledge to produce or to 
mobilize is fairly well defined. But these situations are not the most interesting. The 
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challenges increasingly concern the formulation and framing of issues and problems, 
the research orientations to promote, and the modalities of implementation or 
adjustment of the knowledge and techniques elaborated. Examples of such situations 
abound in the fields of health and the environment. With Vololona Rabeharisoa, I 
have studied patient organizations that have become heavily involved in clinical and 
biological research, as well as in technical innovation (to compensate for their 
disabilities). These patients behave like real researcher-investigators, and we have 
called them researchers in the wild. They weave dense networks of collaboration with 
professional researchers and practitioners. Thus, communities of research and 
innovation are constituted in which patients and specialists collaborate. Patients are 
unquestionably lay experts – a term that Epstein used to describe the behaviour of 
patients in the case of the Aids epidemic. But in my opinion it is more accurate to get 
rid of both words, lay and expert, and to keep only one, that is, researcher or 
investigator. 
By struggling to produce new knowledge, new therapies and suitable prostheses, 
these patients are also struggling to define and assert an identity that suits them. 
Rabinow spoke of biosociality to highlight the interlinking between these two 
movements : acquiring knowledge to exist socially, and existing socially to be able to 
conduct successful investigations. Hence, the importance of conceiving of 
institutions – and the actors fervently apply themselves to it – that allow for the 
synchronization of this dual dynamic, without for all that eliminating what makes 
each of them specific. We need political and scientific institutions that enable the 
simultaneous development of collaborative research between professional 
investigators and investigators in the wild, on the one hand, and the composition of 
the collective, on the other. 
This view of political and scientific processes opens the ways to new forms of 
sociological research. With the concerned groups, sociology can form research 
communities that endeavour to collaboratively introduce organized reflection on this 
complex process. Such reflection serves both to construct new identities and to 
produce knowledge and know-how. This is what we have done with the ‘Agence 
Française contre les Myopathies’. After ten years of collaborative research, everyone 
can review their results. I believe that the organization has learned to know itself 
and to situate its action. It has integrated the idea that patients are researchers in 
the wild, that they have to exert their influence on research, and that by structuring 
research activities they can construct their identity and make it recognized and 
accepted. And we, as social scientists, have been able to elaborate an analytical 
framework that helps us to understand the subtle relations between the new way of 
doing research and the new way of composing the collectives in which we live. 
Moreover, this adventure has helped us a lot to define institutions capable of 
maintaining this dynamic in which science and politics are practised in a radically 
new way. 
Question : Considering that this interview is going to be published in an 
academic journal from a post-graduation program, we would like to ask you 
about what kind of methodological decisions you would suggest to a young 
researcher who is starting his career in STS studies ? 
Your question is difficult and tricky. I suggest that the choice of research subjects be 
based on the opportunity they afford for collaborative research. One should start 
with matters of concern, problems which have not been framed, situations of strong 
uncertainty, to constitute an investigation collective that will benefit the persons 
concerned and ‘professional’ researchers who wish to become PhD students. We are 
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obviously very far from research-action, in which social actors arrive with questions 
for which they expect answers. The idea is no longer to study those who come to see 
us and who ask us, the experts, what they should do, but those who are asking 
questions on what they are and on their way of being. In the one case the expert/lay 
(expert) divide is maintained ; in the other a cooperative investigation is set up to 
reveal new identities and to construct the society that will be composed of these 
identities. 
Michel Callon 
Mines ParisTech - Centre de Sociologie des l’Innovation 
Prix Tocqueville 2008 
intervention de Monsieur Valéry Giscard d’Estaing 
Résumé de l’intervention de M. Valéry Giscard d’Estaing 
D eux questions se posent, pourquoi un prix Tocqueville et pourquoi le prix Tocqueville à Raymond Boudon ? Ces deux questions sont liées entre elles, 
Raymond Boudon reprenant les interrogations et les analyses de Tocqueville. 
Raymond Boudon se demande notamment pourquoi on peut parler en France de 
« pouvoir de la rue », expression intraduisible en anglais ou en allemand (et pour 
cause…). La réponse à cette question est à trouver dans l’analyse que Tocqueville 
fait de la centralisation en France, notamment dans son livre L’Ancien Régime et la 
Révolution. Tocqueville montre la manière dont les organisations locales, ce qu’il 
appelle « l’ancienne constitution de l’Europe », ont été balayées par le mouvement de 
centralisation propre à la France de l’Ancien régime, mouvement continué et 
amplifié avec la Révolution. Depuis, le pouvoir exécutif qui essaie de réformer, 
pouvoir apparemment fort, se trouve affaibli par la cristallisation des 
mécontentements. Ces mouvements de rue se conjuguent avec le développement du 
relativisme. Dans son analyse, Tocqueville oppose la centralisation gouvernementale, 
qui se combine avec l’existence de multiples associations et organisations 
intermédiaires, propre aux États-Unis qui l’ont héritée du Royaume-Uni, à la 
centralisation administrative propre à la France. Par ailleurs, dans la société 
française, la passion dominante est celle de l’égalité. Du coup, on estime que toutes 
les opinions se valent, qu’il n’y a que des interprétations et des points de vue, et pas 
de faits. C’est en quoi le pouvoir de la rue, s’opposant frontalement au pouvoir 
central, est lié au relativisme. 
Raymond Boudon reprend Tocqueville et Weber et, rejetant quant à lui le 
relativisme, estime comme eux que si, à court et moyen terme, la démocratie se 
caractérise par le polythéisme des valeurs, les controverses, les affrontements, à long 
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En 2008, le prix 
Tocqueville a été décerné à 
Raymond Boudon. Le 
président du jury, 
M. Valéry Giscard 
d’Estaing, n’avait pu se 
rendre dans la Manche à 
cette occasion et une 
cérémonie a été organisée à 
l’Institut de France le 
9 février 2009. 
